We study default e ects in the context of a residential electricity-pricing program. We implement a large-scale randomized controlled trial, in which one treatment group was given the option to opt-in to time-based pricing while another was defaulted into the program but allowed to opt-out. We provide dramatic evidence of a default e ect. We also observe customers' electricity consumption in light of the pricing plan they face, which we describe as "follow-on" behavior. This provides insight on the mechanisms behind the default e ect, particularly for "complacent" households (i.e., those who only enroll in time-based pricing if assigned to the opt-out treatment).
Default E ects, Choice Modi cation, and Follow-on Behavior
A rich literature documents and explores various aspects of default e ects in a range of settings, including 401(k) participation (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2002 Choi et al., , 2004 , organ donation (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003; Abadie and Gay, 2006) , car insurance (Johnson et al., 1993) , car purchase options (Park et al., 2000) , and email marketing (Johnson et al., 2002) . This literature o ers a range of possible explanations for default e ects. In instances where the choice is relatively simple and not particularly important, such as agreeing to receive marketing emails, default e ects may stem from rational inattention (Bellman et al., 2001; Sims, 2005) . When confronting a decision that is more complicated or stressful, such as choices about health care or personal nance, choosing not to choose (and thus accepting the default) can allow the decision-maker to avoid incurring the costs of gathering information or evaluating di cult tradeo s (Kressel and Chapman, 2007; Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2007) . If the consumer has limited personal experience with the choice context, the default option can be appealing, particularly if it is perceived to be the prescribed or recommended option (Beshears et al., 2009) .
We aim to extend the literature on default e ects in several ways. First, we highlight the importance of follow-on behavior. In many of the contexts where default provisions are used to in uence choice outcomes, follow-on behavior plays a critical role in determining economic impacts. We make a distinction between two types of follow-on behavior. First, individuals may choose to subsequently modify the option they chose by default. For example, a consumer who accepts a particular 401(k) plan as a default option might subsequently adjust the parameters of this choice by changing the savings rate, changing the asset allocation, or dropping o the plan altogether. Second, there may be important choices or actions that are contingent on -but distinct from -the initial choice. Building on the retirement savings plan example, participating in a 401(k) plan could impact savings via other vehicles. 2 To date, the literature on default e ects has emphasized the initial choice and placed less emphasis on the implications for subsequent decisions. In particular, we are not aware of studies that consider the contingent behaviors that can be indirectly in uenced by default e ects. Analyses of 401(k) investment decisions have considered the rst type of follow-on behavior -modi cations to the original choice. For example, Carroll et al. (2009) analyze savings outcomes over time as a function of di erent default options at the initial plan participation decision. Other work includes information about follow-on choices, but does not model the impact of the default setting on those choices. For example, Ketcham et al. (2016) include information about Medicaid recipients' prescription drug spending in their welfare calculation, but do not model how plan choice impacts drug expenditures. Our study provides an unusual opportunity to analyze not only the direct e ect of a default manipulation on an initial choice, but also the ways in which the default e ect operates through the initial choice to a ect subsequent consumer decisions.
Our empirical results also shed light on the underlying mechanisms that can give rise to default e ects in this setting, and the associated welfare implications. Ultimately, the consumer-level impacts will depend on whether the default choice is well-suited to those who are susceptible to default e ects. Recent papers have investigated the welfare e ects of nudges in a variety of settings, including retirement savings plan default provisions (Carroll et al., 2009; Bernheim et al., 2015) , health insurance plan choices (Handel, 2013; Handel and Kolstad, 2015; Ketcham et al., 2016) , and home energy conservation reports (Allcott and Kessler, 2015) . These papers augment the more standard utility maximization framework to accommodate features of consumer behavior (such as inattention) that could rationalize a default e ect (or, in the case of Bernheim et al., 2015 , they mediate between several di erent explanations for the default e ect).
We consider several alternative explanations for the default e ect and assess which seems most consistent with our data. The most straightforward explanations are predicated on the assumption that consumers' preferences are pre-determined and their choices are utility-maximizing and well informed. Under these standard assumptions, a default e ect can manifest if agents incur a cost to switch from the default choice, or if consumers are inattentive to unfamiliar choices. Alternative models, such as those introduced by Bernheim et al. (2015) , assume that the default provision a ects not only the level of e ort required to select a given choice, but also the frame through which the choice is viewed and the process by which the agent constructs her preferences. If the utility-maximizing choice is frame dependent, welfare analysis becomes more complicated.
We evaluate alternative explanations of the default e ect using not only observed participation decisions, but also rich data on subsequent electricity consumption patterns as well as survey responses describing consumer experiences. We nd that observed consumer behavior is consistent with explanations under which consumers are not paying attention to the initial choice, but come to understand it and like it. One implication is that standard welfare analysis predicated on the assumption of known preferences and informed choices can generate misleading estimates of welfare impacts.
Empirical Setting and Experimental Design
Economists have noted for some time that e cient pricing of electricity should re ect changing electricity market conditions (e.g., Boiteux, 1964a,b) . Electricity demand, marginal system operating costs, and rms' abilities to exercise market power vary signi cantly and systematically over hours of the day and seasons of the year. Figure 1 demonstrates the extent of this variation for a week during our study. The red line depicts hourly electricity demand, which cycles predictably over the course of a day, varying by a factor of 1.5 to almost 3 from the middle of the night to the peak hours in the late afternoon. The blue line depicts hourly wholesale prices, which fall below $60/MWh in most hours, but spike to over $1,000/MWh 6 at critical peak times. [FIGURE 1 HERE] Although wholesale electricity prices can vary signi cantly across hours, at least partially re ecting variations in marginal costs, retail prices do not generally re ect these dynamic market conditions. The vast majority (over 95 percent in 2012) of U.S. residential customers pay time-invariant prices for electricity (FERC, 2014) . If customers are not exposed to prices that re ect variable marginal operating costs, economic theory suggests that consumers will under-consume in periods of low marginal costs and overconsume in periods of high marginal costs. This further implies over-investment in capacity to meet excessive peak demand. For example, Borenstein and Holland (2005) simulate that by shifting a fraction of customers to time-based rates, utilities could construct 44 percent fewer peaking plants.
In principle, these ine ciencies can be mitigated -or eliminated -with the introduction of time-varying retail electricity pricing. Residential customers have an important role to play in electricity demand response, particularly in areas of the country where peak residential demand (driven by air conditioning in many parts of the U.S.) coincides with the system peak. When residential customers have been exposed to time-based prices, prior analyses suggest they are willing and able to adjust consumption in response (see, for example, EPRI, 2012). 3 To reap bene ts from time-varying pricing, though, utilities need to enroll more customers in timevarying pricing programs. In what follows, we describe a large-scale eld experiment designed to evaluate a novel approach to increasing participation among residential electricity customers. 4 3 In a 2012 meta-analysis, authors identi ed what they deemed to be the best seven U.S. residential pricing studies up to that time (EPRI, 2012). These studies document peak demand response to time-varying pricing in the range of 13-33%, depending on the existence of automated control technology (e.g., programmable communicating thermostat).These estimates imply an elasticity of substitution in the range of 0.07 -0.24 and an own-price elasticity in the range of -0.07 --0.3. Note that the experimental nature of our study allows us to assess many dimensions of customers' responses to time-based pricing, including spillovers within and across days. Some previous evaluations of time-based pricing have relied on within-customers comparisons, which assume there are no spillovers of this sort. 4 A much smaller-scale experiment was conducted under the same DOE program in Los Alamos. Results of this study are summarized in a recent working paper (Wang and Ida (2017) ). Residential customers were recruited to participate in a demand response experiment. Of these, 365 were given the option to opt-in to a time-varying rate and 183 customers were defaulted onto the new rate. Whereas opt-in rates typically fall within the range of 2-10%, 64% of customers opted into the time varying rate. Presumably, this is because the study sample is comprised of only those customers who actively select into a eld experiment. Interpretation of the estimated demand response is further complicated by the fact that program participants were insured against losses (i.e., they could only gain from participating in the experiment). 7
The Experiment
The experiment was implemented as part of the Smart Grid Investment Grant (SGIG) program, which received $3.4 billion in funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The goal of this program was to invest in the expansion of the smart grid in the U.S., and thereby create jobs and accelerate the modernization of the nation's electric system (Department of Energy, 2012). One of the objectives articulated in the Funding Opportunity Announcement (DE-FOA-0000058) under the heading of Consumer Behavior Studies (CBS) was to document the impacts and bene ts of time-based rate programs and associated enabling control and information technologies. To be eligible for funding, the use of randomized controlled experimental designs for evaluating these impacts and bene ts was required.
The Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD), a municipal utility that serves approximately 530,000 residential households in and around Sacramento, California, implemented one of the 11 CBS studies that were funded under the SGIG program. 5 They were awarded a $127 million grant overall, which comprised part of a $308 million smart grid project. SMUD viewed the opportunity to study the impact of time-varying rates within their own service territory as a major bene t to participating in the program (Jimenez et al., 2013) . SMUD had some demand response programs in place prior to the SGIG program (e.g., an air conditioner direct control program and some rates that varied by time-of-use), but these programs had not been broadly emphasized or marketed for a long time. Historic adoption of their "legacy" Time-of-Use rates had been extremely low. From SMUD's perspective, the SGIG program was an opportunity to maximize the bene ts of their smart-grid technology investments, and to test time-varying rates that were designed to meet their evolving load management needs (Jimenez et al. 2013 ).
The study sample was drawn from SMUD's larger population of residential customers. To de ne the experimental population, several selection criteria were applied. Households were excluded if their smart meter had not provided a year's worth of data by June 2012, if they were participating in SMUD's Air Conditioning Load Management program, Summer Solutions study, PV solar programs, budget billing programs, or medical assistance programs, or if they had master-metered accounts. After these exclusions, approximately 174,000 households remained eligible for the experimental population. 6 5 The other ten studies are described in Cappers and Sheer (2016) . Most evaluated other aspects of time-varying pricing, such as the impact of providing customers with "shadow" bills, which documented how much they would have paid under standard pricing. Only one of the other studies compared opt-in and opt-out recruitment approaches (Lakeland Electric) but the data the utility provided did not contain enough detail to perform a comparable analysis. 6 SMUD reports no statistically signi cant di erences between the households in the study sample and the larger residential customer base. We did not have access to these sample comparisons, and we do not know which variables were analyzed. Most 8 Households in the experimental population were randomly assigned to one of ten groups, ve of which are the focus of this paper. 7 Households in four of these ve groups were encouraged to participate in a new pricing program; the fth group received no encouragement and serves as the control group. There were two pricing treatments: a Time-of-Use (TOU) and a Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) program. There were also two forms of encouragement: opt-in, where households were encouraged to enroll in the rate program;
and opt-out, where households were noti ed that they were enrolled by default, but had the opportunity to leave the program if they wished. All encouraged households (opt-in and opt-out) were also o ered enabling technology -an in-home display that provided real-time information on consumption and the current price. Figure 2 summarizes the standard, TOU, and CPP rate structures that are evaluated in this study. All SMUD customers face an increasing block pricing structure. This means that the price paid for the rst block or "tier" of electricity consumed during a billing period is lower than the price paid for the higher tier. During the time period of our study, customers on the standard rate plan (i.e., customers in the control group) paid a $10 monthly xed charge plus $0.0938 per kWh for the rst 700 kWh of consumption and $0.1765 per kWh for consumption above 700 kWh. Under the TOU program, customers faced the same monthly xed charge of $10. These customers pay a higher rate, $0.2700 per kWh, for electricity consumed during the "peak period" from 4PM to 7PM on non-holiday weekdays. They pay a lower rate (relative to the standard rate structure), in all other "o -peak" hours, $0.0846 per kWh for the rst 700 kWh and $0.1660 for consumption above 700 kWh. (On-peak consumption did not count towards the 700 kWh total.) Customers on the CPP plan pay a signi cantly higher rate, $0.7500 per kWh, for consumption between 4PM and 7PM on twelve "event days" over the course of the summer. Customers were alerted about event days at least one day in advance. Consumption outside of the CPP event window was charged at a rate of $0.0851 per kWh up to 700 kWh and $0.1665 per kWh beyond.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
Both the CPP and TOU rates were only in e ect between June 1 and September 30 for the two summers in the study (2012 and 2013) . Low-income customers enrolled in the Energy Assistance Program Rate residential customers had smart meters in time for the experiment, though many were excluded because many meters had not reported a full year of data by June 2012. 7 The other ve groups were defaulted to another time-varying rate that did not have a corresponding opt-in group treatment (a CPP plus TOU rate), encouraged to opt in to CPP or TOU without the enabling technology described below or were part of a recruit and deny randomized controlled trial for Time of Use rates. 9 (EAPR) were eligible to participate in the study. No matter the pricing plan, EAPR customers received about a 30 percent discount on their rates. Both the TOU and CPP rates were designed to be approximately revenue neutral to the utility if customers selected their rate plan randomly and did not adjust their consumption (see Jimenez et al. 2013) .
To summarize, the ve randomized groups we study include: the CPP opt-in group, which was encouraged to enroll in the CPP program; the CPP opt-out group, which was noti ed of enrollment and encouraged to stay in the CPP program; the TOU opt-in group, which was encouraged to enroll in TOU program; the TOU opt-out group, which was noti ed of enrollment and encouraged to stay in TOU program; and the control group, which was not encouraged to participate in a rate program and remained on SMUD's standard rates.
Encouragement Messages
Customers assigned to the CPP or TOU treatment arms were encouraged to enroll in time-varying pricing.
Materials and messaging were virtually identical across the opt-in and opt-out groups. The encouragement e ort for opt-in households consisted of two separate mailed packets. The rst was sent in either October 2011, to about 20 percent of the encouraged households, or November 2011, to the remaining 80 percent.
The second was sent in January 2012. Each packet included a a letter, a brochure, and a postage-paid business reply card that the household could mail back to SMUD indicating their choice to either join the program or not. The recruitment materials listed generic bene ts of participating in rate programs, including saving money, taking control, and helping the environment. In March of 2012, door hangers were placed on the doorknobs of encouraged households. Finally, an extensive phone bank campaign was carried out throughout April and May of 2012, with calls going out almost daily.
Recruitment activities and program enrollment are summarized in Figure 3 . About half of the customers enrolled following the packet and door hanger recruitment phase, while the second half were successfully enrolled over the timeframe of the phone campaign (though about 22 percent of these still indicated their desire to enroll by way of the business reply cards).
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
The opt-out groups were mailed one packet containing a letter, brochure, and business reply card.
These materials were designed to look as similar as possible to the materials received by members of the opt-in groups. Packet mailings were followed within two weeks by a reminder post card. About 10 percent of the packets were sent on March 12, 2012 and the remaining 90 percent were sent on April 5, 2012.
The TOU opt-in group received slightly di erent encouragement messages from the other groups because they were part of a recruit-and-delay randomized controlled trial (which we are not incorporating into this study). In the rst packet mailed in late 2011, the households were given the same information as other groups regarding the starting date of the pricing experiment. However, in the packet mailed in January 2012, there was text that informed them that if they decided to opt-in to the rate program, they would be randomly assigned to a start date of either 2012 or 2014. The other three groups were told that their participation date would start in 2012 if they decided to opt-in or not opt-out throughout all communications they received. This means that the set of always takers in the CPP opt-in group could be somewhat di erent from the always-takers in the TOU group, as the TOU always takers had to be willing to accept some probability that their enrollment would be delayed. Thus, while the CPP opt-in group can be directly compared to the CPP opt-out group, comparisons between the TOU opt-out and opt-in groups are drawn with the caveat that these two groups were encouraged and recruited somewhat di erently.
Data and Methodology

Data Description
The data we use in our analysis are comprised of household-speci c data, electricity consumption data, and weather data. The household-speci c data includes experimental cell assignment, dates of enrollment, disenrollment, and account closure information for households who moved. In addition, we observe whether households were on SMUD's Energy Assistance Program Rate (EAPR) for low-income customers, as well as whether or not they had set up a "My Account" online to interface with their SMUD account, and the number of times they had signed in to their My Account page. Finally, for some households, we have responses to two large-scale surveys administered to customers on the new rate programs as well as a sample of control households, including a demographic survey and a customer satisfaction survey.
We also have data on households' energy consumption, as well as their associated expenditures. Specifically, we have data on hourly energy consumption for each household starting on June 1, 2011 and continuing through October 31, 2013, the end of the pilot period. Electricity consumption is measured in kilowatt hours (kWh). We collect energy consumption data for all households in the experimental sample, including the control group, for the duration of the study period. Households that moved are one exception. These households were not tracked to their new location, so data for these households ends when they moved from their initial location.
In addition to the hourly energy consumption data, billing data were also obtained for all households in the experiment. These data include the total energy (kWh) charged in each bill, as well as the total dollar amount of the bill. Hourly energy consumption and billing data are quite complete. Less than one percent of these data are missing. The frequency of missing data does not di er systematically across treatment groups, nor across households who did or did not opt in or opt out of treatment.
The nal type of data we use are hourly weather data, including dry and wet bulb temperature as well as humidity. There is only one weather station in close proximity to all participants in the SMUD service area, so the weather data does not vary across households, only over time. Table 1 provides summary statistics by experimental group. The top three rows summarize information on daily consumption, the ratio of peak to o -peak energy consumption and billing from the pre-treatment summer (June to September 2011). SMUD households consume slightly less electricity than the average U.S. household -approximately 27 kWh per day during the four summer months compared to almost 31 kWh per day across the U.S. in 2011. The ratio of peak to o -peak usage provides one indication of a customer's exposure to the higher peak prices under CPP or TOU, and bill amounts re ect the average monthly bill in the pre-treatment summer. Bills in our sample are very close to the national average, re ecting that SMUD customers pay higher prices than the average U.S. residential customer. For all three variables, we also report t-statistics on the test that the mean for each treatment group equals the mean for the control group. The t-statistic exceeds one for only one of these comparisons, suggesting that the randomization yielded groups with very similar means across these three variables. 8
Validation of Randomization
The next two variables measure the share of households that would pay less on either the CPP or TOU pricing policy, assuming no change in their consumption. (Following industry convention, we refer to households who would pay less as "structural winners. ") Approximately half of all customers are estimated to be structural winners, based on consumption data collected before the intervention. The bottom four rows summarize household-level covariates that we observe for every household in the experiment. "My Account" is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the household had signed up to use SMUD's online portal prior to our experiment. For those customers who have enrolled in the online portal, "My Account logins" summarizes the number of log-ins. "Paperless" is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the household had signed up to receive electronic bills. Finally, "Low income" is a dummy variable indicating enrollment in the low-income rate. Of the 24 t-statistics reported across these six variables, only one exceeds two, again con rming the integrity of the randomization process.
[ 
Methodology
Estimating ITT for experimental treatment groups
We estimate a di erence-in-di erences (DID) speci cation using data from the pre-treatment and treatment periods to identify the average intent to treat (ITT) e ect. Equation (1) serves as our baseline estimating equation, where y it measures hourly electricity consumption for household i in hour t. These speci cations are estimated separately for the opt-in and opt-out groups. Z it is an indicator variable equal to one starting on June 1, 2012 if household i was encouraged to be in the treatment group, and zero otherwise. γ i is a household xed e ect that captures systematic di erences in consumption across households, and τ t is an hour-of-sample xed e ect.
We estimate four sets of regression equations. Each set uses data from the control group and one of the four treatment groups. The coe cient of interest is β IT T , which captures the average di erence in hourly electricity consumption across treated and control groups, controlling for any pre-treatment di erences by group. 9 Within each set, we estimate the model separately using data from event day peak hours (4pm to 7pm on the twelve CPP days in each summer) and non-event day peak hours (4pm to 7pm on non-event, non-holiday weekdays during the summer). 10
Estimating LATE for experimental treatment groups
We estimate a DID instrumental variables (IV) speci cation using data from the pre-treatment and treatment periods to identify a Local Average Treatment E ect (LATE). Speci cally, we estimate equation 2, where y it , γ i , and τ t are de ned as in equation 1. T reat it is an indicator variable equal to one starting on June 1st, 2012 if household i was actually enrolled in treatment, zero otherwise (estimated separately for the opt-in and opt-out groups). We instrument for T reat it using the randomized encouragement to the corresponding treatment Z it .
The β LAT E coe cient captures the Local Average Treatment E ect (LATE). In this speci cation, the LATE measures the average reduction in household electricity consumption among customers enrolled in the time-varying pricing program. To interpret β LAT E as a causal e ect, we must invoke an exclusion restriction, which requires that the encouragement (i.e., the o er to opt in or default assignment into treatment with the ability to opt out) a ects electricity consumption only indirectly via an e ect on participation. We also invoke a monotonicity assumption which requires that our encouragement weakly increases (versus reduces) the participation probability for all households. Appendix 3 discusses these identifying assumptions and summarizes some ancillary analysis of the exclusion restriction. 11
Estimating LATE for Complacents
Conceptually, our sample of residential customers can be divided into three groups (see Figure 4 ). Nevertakers are households who opt-out of an opt-out program and do not enroll in an opt-in program. Complacents are households who do not actively enroll in an opt-in program, but who also do not actively drop out of an opt-out program. Always-takers are households who actively enroll in an opt-in program and remain in an opt-out program. Note that a comparison of average electricity consumption across the opt-in and opt-out groups (the top two rows in Figure 4 ) estimates the average e ect of being assigned to the opt-in versus opt-out groups. Scaling this di erence by our estimate of the population share of complacents yields an unbiased estimate of the average e ect of time-varying rates on electricity consumption 11 Ancillary analysis which assesses the plausibility of this exclusion restriction assumption is included in the appendix. 14 among complacents. 12 [FIGURE 4 HERE] We estimate the DID IV speci cation using data from the opt-in and opt-out groups, as shown in equation 2, where all variables are de ned as above, except now T reat it is instrumented for with an indicator variable equal to one for observations starting on June 1, 2012 if a household was encouraged into the opt-out treatment group only.
This IV speci cation provides an intuitive way to isolate the average causal e ect of these pricing programs on electricity consumption among complacents. To interpret our estimates in this way, we again invoke the exclusion restriction which requires that the encouragement (the o er to opt-in or the default assignment with the ability to opt-out) does not directly a ect electricity consumption among always takers, never takers, or complacents. Table 2 summarizes customer acceptance of time-varying pricing in the opt-in and opt-out groups, respectively. The columns titled "Initial" summarize customer participation at the beginning of June 2012
Main Results
Default E ects on Program Adoption
(the month the new rates went into e ect). The columns titled "Endline" summarize participation at the end of the second summer (September 2013). In both sets of results, the rst column re ects the share of customers on the time-varying rate while the second column reports the number of customers on the rate.
[ The initial participation results provide striking evidence of the default e ect. For both the CPP and TOU rates, approximately 20 percent of those assigned to the opt-in encouragement elected to opt-in.
Fewer than 5 percent opted out when defaulted onto the new rate structure, leaving over 95 percent of the customers on the new rates in the default treatment. 13
To interpret the "Endline" columns, it is important to understand how we are describing the eligible population. If customers moved, they were no longer eligible for the time-based rates, even if they moved within SMUD's service territory. Also, new occupants were not included in the pilot program. The numbers in Table 2 report year across their entire residential population, so a move rate of 25 percent over a 16-month period that includes the summer, when moves are most likely, is reasonable. Across the four columns, the move rates are very similar, ranging from 23 percent in the CPP opt-out group to 26 percent in the TOU opt-in. 14
Choice Modi cation
We observe modi cations to consumers' participation choices after the program started, although program rules constrained the set of possible changes. Customers in the opt-in group were not allowed to enroll after June 1, 2012; customers in the opt-out group who had already opted-out were not allowed to change their minds and enroll. However, customers in both groups who had initially chosen to participate in the time-varying rate program could revert to the standard rate at any time.
The nal column of Table 2 reports the di erence between initial and endline participation rates, divided by the initial participation rate. Participation in both of the opt-in groups fell by fewer than 1.5 percentage points, re ecting fewer than 10 percent of the original participants. Participation in both of the opt-out groups fell by more percentage points (6.6 in the case of CPP opt out, 96.0 -89.4, and 5.3 in the case of TOU opt out), but again re ected fewer than 10 percent of the original participants.
With such a small share of households dropping out of these programs, tests comparing attrition rates across the opt-in and opt-out groups are low powered. The appendix reports results from a hazard analysis of drop outs. Several interesting patterns emerge. First, although the rates of attrition over the entire study were similar, the opt-in participants (both TOU and CPP) dropped out sooner than opt-out. For households in the opt-out groups, the reminder sent to participants before the second summer had a statistically signi cant e ect on drop-outs.
In sum, sections 5. Table 3 summarizes the estimation results for the di erence-in-di erences (DID) speci cation of equation 1 that uses data from the pre-treatment and treatment periods to identify an intent to treat (ITT) e ect.
The rst two columns use data from peak hours on "critical event" days. In the post-treatment period, these correspond to days when a CPP event was called. In the pre-treatment period, these correspond to the hottest non-holiday weekdays during the summer of 2011. 15 The right two columns use data from all other summer weekdays. In all cases the analysis is limited to the peak periods of the relevant days (4PM to 7PM).
[ If we interpret the coe cients in Table 3 as estimates of the causal impact of encouragement to join the time-varying rates, we conclude that providing households the opportunity to opt-in to the CPP treatment leads to an average reduction in electricity consumption of 0.130 kWh during peak hours of event days (averaged across all household that received the opt-in o er). The estimate for the opt-out group is considerably larger at 0.299 kWh across all households defaulted onto the CPP rate.
The coe cients in the last two columns show that CPP customers reduced their consumption during peak hours on non-event days (by 0.028 kWh per household in the opt-in group and 0.095 kWh per household in the opt-out group). Recall that CPP customers faced rates that are slightly lower than the standard rates on these non-event days. These kWh reductions are considerably smaller compared to event days for the CPP households, but still statistically signi cant. Why might consumers respond to a decrease in electricity price with a decrease in consumption? This is consistent with habit formation, learned preferences, (e.g., if households learn that they can comfortably open windows instead of turning on the air conditioning), or a xed adjustment cost (e.g., if customers set programmable thermostats to run air conditioning less between 4 and 7 PM on all days, even when they only face higher prices on a subset of those days).
In the case of the TOU group, who faced higher prices during peak hours for all weekdays (not just event days,) the results show that households reduced their daily peak consumption by 0.090 kWh on average in the opt-in treatment, and 0.129 kWh on average in the opt-out treatment on days that were called as event days for CPP customers (i.e., relatively hotter days). On all other peak days average reductions are estimated to be 0.055 kWh per household in the opt-in treatment, and 0.100 kWh per hour in the optout treatment. Given that non-event-day consumption is lower, the results are approximately the same in percentage terms (3.6-5.1% for the opt-in group and 5.9 -7.2% for the opt-out group -see Appendix 4).
The exclusion restriction implies that always takers in the opt-out group are responding to the timevarying rates in the same way as their counterparts in the opt-in group. Under this assumption, di erences in these estimated ITT e ects across the opt-in and opt-out groups are driven by a demand response among complacents. We have also estimated the opt-in and opt-out equations jointly so that we could test equality of the coe cients. We can reject equality with at least 95% certainty in all cases except for event day TOU, where p = 0.055.
Finally, we regenerate the results reported in Table 3 using only the post-intervention data. In other words, we do not use the pre-period data, and we simply compare treated households' consumption to the control households' during event and non-event peak hours. This exercise yield qualitatively similar results, which are summarized in Appendix Table A6 . The average reductions for the opt-out group are nearly 3 times larger than the average reductions for the opt-in group for CPP and 2 times larger for TOU.
The coe cient estimates do di er slightly from those reported in Table 3 since there were some pre-period di erences by group, even if those di erences are not statistically signi cant. watts per hour) is large and suggests consumers did more than simply turn o a few light bulbs. Given that electricity rates increased by almost 100 percent during critical peak events, this reduction o a mean of almost 2,500 watts is consistent with a price elasticity of approximately -0.25. This is on the high side of 18 other short-run demand elasticities estimated for electricity consumption, though typically those estimates are based on demand reductions over longer time periods (EPRI, 2012) . In the fourth and fth columns, we see again that households in both the opt-in and opt-out CPP treatments signi cantly reduced their consumption on non-event peak days. Complacents' average reductions on non-event days comprise a larger share of the average critical peak reductions than is true for always takers. This is consistent with the latter group ne-tuning their demand to changing conditions, whereas complacents may rely to a larger extent on modi cations that do not require sustained attention (such as reprogramming a thermostat to reduce cooling load during peak hours on all days).
Local Average Treatment E ects (LATE)
In the case of the TOU treatments, the LATE estimates indicate that always-takers reduced consumption during daily peaks that were called as event days for the CPP treatment by about three times as much as the combination of always-takers plus complacents in the TOU opt-out group (0.473 relative to 0.136 kWh per household), and almost three times as much (0.288 relative to 0.105 kWh per household) during non-event regular peak days. 16
[TABLE 4 HERE]
The results in the third and sixth column isolate the e ect of time-varying rates on electricity consumption among the complacent households. Comparing the results in the rst column (always-takers), to the results in the third column (complacents), suggests that the average response among always takers to the CPP rate was about 2.5 times larger than the response among complacents during event hours.
Complacents were somewhat more similar to always takers during non-event peak hours, reducing by only half as much. 17 Di erences between always takers and complacents are more pronounced with the TOU rates. Given that there are so many more complacents exposed to the rates under an opt-out experimental design, the aggregate savings from an opt-out design is signi cantly higher than from an opt-in design (as is made evident in Table 3 ).
Tables 3 and 4 have averaged treatment e ects across all peak hours. Figure 5 illustrates these e ects graphically, disaggregating by hour. The gure depicts hour-by-hour LATE estimates for event days across the four treatment groups relative to the control group. We also test for changes in consumption during 16 In joint speci cations, we can reject that the coe cient estimates are equal across the opt-in and opt-out groups in all cases except for the CPP treatment on non-event days (p=0.249). 17 Note that the coe cient estimates for the opt-out group in Table 4 are equal to the weighted sum of the coe cients for the always takers (e.g., -0.664 for CPP event hours) and the complacents (-0.233), with weights set equal to the share of always takers relative to total opt-out enrollees and one minus this number from Table 2 . non-peak hours. One might expect that some consumers would increase consumption in the hours leading up to the peak period (cooling the house when prices are relatively low, for example). However, we nd that consumers are reducing consumption in the hours before the peak period, statistically signi cantly so for the always takers in both the CPP and TOU groups. [FIGURE 5 HERE] 6 Cost-E ectiveness and System-Wide Impacts This section summarizes the impact of the pricing plans on customer bills and utility revenues. To inform this analysis, we estimate an alternative form of equation 2 using customer-by-month observations and total bill amount as the dependent variable. Table 5 summarizes the estimation results. The coe cient estimate in the rst column of the top panel suggests that bills for customers who opted in to the CPP rate plan fell by approximately 5% on average, with a mean reduction of $6.52 on an average summer bill of nearly $115. Bills for the typical participant in the opt-out group fell by less -around $4.50 for the group overall and slightly less for the complacents. This is consistent with the results presented in Table 4 , which shows how complacent households reduced consumption by less during critical peak periods. 18 Table 6 analyzes the pricing programs from the perspective of the utility, comparing the costs of enrolling participants and implementing the program against the bene ts (i.e., costs avoided when peak consumption is reduced). The analysis in Table 6 assumes each pricing program was scaled to SMUD's entire residential customer base and run for 10 years. Some of these program bene ts and costs are summarized in Potter et al. (2014) , a consulting report prepared to help SMUD decide whether to expand the pilot. We also obtained details not included in the report from personal communications with SMUD and their consultants. Appendix section 5 summarizes underlying assumptions, and explains why some of the assumptions pertaining to program bene ts are likely conservative.
The two columns on the left summarize the two main bene ts of the program. Reduced demand during CPP and TOU peak hours avoids two types of expenses -the costs incurred to supply su cient electricity to meet peak demand during these hours, and the expected cost of new investments in peaking plants needed to meet demand in peak hours. To estimate the avoided capacity costs, the expectation is taken over the probability that demand in CPP or TOU hours would drive capacity expansion decisions. Notably, the avoided energy costs are considerably smaller than the avoided capacity costs, particularly for the CPP programs. This re ects the fact that electricity demand in a small number of peak hours drives costly generating capacity expansions. Given that electricity is not storable, current electricity systems include peaking plants that only operate several hours a year. Reducing demand in peak periods avoids the need to construct and maintain these plants going forward. 19 We break the program costs into three components: (1) one-time xed costs, which include items such as IT costs to adjust the billing system and initial program design costs, (2) one-time per-household costs which primarily include the customer acquisition costs, including the in-home devices o ered to customers as part of the recruitment, and (3) recurring annual xed and variable costs, which include personnel costs required to administer the program. The one-time variable cost of recruiting customers is lower under the opt-out programs than under the opt-in. As we note in section 3, more e ort was invested in recruiting customers assigned to the opt-in group.
Net bene ts are reported in the nal column of Table 6 . We estimate that both opt-out programs would be cost-e ective. The CPP opt-in program is estimated to be marginally cost-e ective. The TOU opt-in program, which led to much smaller demand reductions than the CPP program, is projected to incur costs in excess of savings.
Explanations for the Default E ect
In addition to assessing the program outcomes from the perspective of the utility, we are also interested in understanding why customers are predisposed to choose the default option. Some explanations for default e ects presume known preferences and well-informed choices. Under alternative explanations, defaulting inattentive or uninformed customers to a new pricing regime encourages customers to learn about a new experience and "construct" their preferences. These di erent rationalizations of a default e ect can have very di erent implications for consumer welfare.
Prior studies have identi ed several potential explanations for default e ects but have made little progress identifying precisely which mechanisms are at work in a given setting. We are uniquely posi- 19 As we explain in the appendix, the calculations re ected in Table 6 may understate the capacity bene ts, for example because they do not measure reductions in transmission and distribution level investments. Because the numbers in Table 6 re ect private bene ts to the utility, they do not incorporate the value of avoided pollution. Given that the avoided energy savings are low relative to the avoided capacity, we suspect that avoided pollution would not change the overall cost-bene t calculus by much. tioned to investigate alternative explanations for the default e ect as we have detailed information about the determinants of the initial choice, together with rich data on follow-on behavior, as well as responses to survey questions on attitudes towards time-varying pricing.
Standard Economic Model
As a starting point, we begin with a standard economic model that assumes consumers make informed decisions based on known preferences. Within this framework, costs incurred to switch away from the default choice can give rise to a default e ect. In what follows, we use this model to generate qualitative predictions that can be evaluated empirically. We also show how, under some reasonable assumptions, we can estimate a lower bound on consumers' willingness to pay for the new pricing program.
Suppose that consumers choose the electricity price structure P to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint:
The rst term captures disutility from e ort, which is only expended if the customer actively switches to a di erent pricing plan. The second term captures the indirect utility from future consumption, which is a function of electricity prices, the price of all other goods (normalized to 1), and income Y. For notational ease, we will refer to this indirect utility component as V (P ).
LetP denote the vector of electricity prices under the uniform price regime and letP denote the Within this stylized framework, the top panel illustrates participation choices if the default is d =P and customers can chose to switch toP (i.e., the opt-in treatment). A qualitative prediction is that only 22 those customers with the largest indirect utility gains (i.e., gains that exceed the switching costs) will opt-in. Thus, the customers who actively switch to the time-varying rate lie within the blue shaded area.
Taken together, these customers (the always takers) incur switching costs E; the net gain in utility is area In this stylized illustration, it is straightforward to show that total consumer welfare is maximized by setting d = P . The welfare gain from switching the default to P fromP is ED − CB. Of course, in our applied setting, we cannot directly observe the utility each household associates with alternative pricing regimes. To quantitatively estimate the welfare implications of switching the default choice, we would need to explicitly specify the form of the utility function in Equation (3). Rather than impose this degree of structure, we introduce a set of weaker assumptions which allow us to empirically evaluate the qualitative predictions of the model and estimate a lower bound on consumers' welfare loss from switching.
To draw empirically testable implications out of the model, we continue to assume that the consumer has well-de ned preferences over electricity pricing programs, and that the consumer chooses the program that maximizes her utility. We note that the welfare impacts of switching to a time-varying electricity rate can manifest in three ways. First, any change in electricity expenditures a ect residual savings or expenditures on other goods. Second, any re-optimization of energy consumption patterns in response to the price change (such as turning up the thermostat on a hot day) will a ect the level of utility derived from energy consumption. Finally, re-optimization of energy consumption patterns can require e ort through learning or adjustment costs which we denote A.
If we further assume that utility is quasilinear in electricity and all other goods, a monetary measure 23 of the utility change associated with a switch from P to P can be summarized as:
whereX re ects the optimal vector of electricity consumption under time-varying prices and X re ects the optimal vector of electricity consumption under uniform pricing. The rst argument in brackets measures the change in electricity expenditures associated with switching to time-varying pricing, holding consumption patterns constant. Importantly, this provides an upper bound on the welfare loss (among structural losers), or a lower bound on the welfare gains (among structural winners). The second argument measures the change in electricity expenditures net of adjustment costs in a scenario where the consumer adjusts consumption in response to time-varying pricing. In theory, the consumer will only choose to re-optimize if the bene ts exceed the adjustment costs.
We can estimate P X − P X, i.e. the lower bound on customers' willingness to pay to switch to the time-varying rate, using rich data from the pre-intervention period. Figure 7 preservation assumption (i.e., any re-optimization toX does not change the rank order of utility changes across consumers). This would be violated if, for example, consumers were most likely to reoptimize if they would otherwise pay higher bills under the new pricing ("structural losers" in the terminology used above). In Appendix Table A6 , we report versions of equation 2 which allow the response to vary for structural losers and nd that, if anything, structural losers are less likely to adjust their consumption.
Having estimated these customer-speci c structural gains, we can ask whether the observed participation choices are qualitatively consistent with predictions of the model that assumes well-de ned, predetermined preferences and switching costs. Figure 7 summarizes participation decisions by decile of savings. Similar to Figure 6 , we represent the opt-in scenarios in the top two gures and opt-out in the bottom. We use blue shading to represent customers who are participating in the new pricing program and red shading to represent customers who continue to face standard pricing. For example, in Figure 7a , 10% of the households would have experienced losses of more than $30 over summer 2011 had they been on a CPP rate instead of the at rate. Of these, however, 15% opted in to the new rate. In general, the patterns depicted in Figure 7 starkly contrast with Figure 6 . In all cases, a signi cant share of the structural losers participate in the new rate and even some of the households that stand to gain the most from the rate without adjusting their consumption opt-out. These patterns cast doubt on the usefulness of a model that presumes switching costs incurred by fully-informed consumers explain the default e ect in this context.
Alternative Explanations
Several alternative explanations for the default e ect could apply in this setting. One potential explanation is rooted in rational inattention, a form of bounded rationality. When information is costly to acquire, consumers may choose to act on incomplete information rather than incur the cost to become perfectly informed. Sallee (2014) argues that it can be rational for consumers to choose among energy-consuming durables, like automobiles or home appliances, without acquiring complete information about energy efciency. Given the relatively small gains from switching to a time-varying pricing regime, a similar argument could apply here. For many customers, it could be rational to rely on cues, such as default choices, rather than invest in collecting full information about this electricity price plan choice.
A second explanation is predicated on the idea that consumers have inconsistent expectations about their own actions. This type of model would predict procrastination, which could be one explanation for consumers remaining on the default plan when they would prefer not to be. For example, customers assigned to the opt-out group may have intended to opt-out of the plan, but never got around to it. Conversely, customers assigned to the opt-in treatment may have intended to opt in but never acted on that intent. If this procrastination behavior is pervasive, it could explain a signi cant default e ect. And, welfare analysis based on a model that rationalizes the impact of a default switch using switching costs can overestimate the cost of the default switch.
A third perspective, which departs even further from a standard model, posits that preferences are constructed -versus uncovered -by consumers as they weigh and experience alternative options. In this setting, observed choices reveal not only the agent's valuation of the alternatives, but also the processing strategies used to construct the preferred choice. In other words, a consumer's preference for time-varying 25 pricing can depend on how the choice is presented and how she comes to understand it. This perspective introduces some additional heuristic explanations for default e ects. For one, people may interpret the default choice as an informative suggestion or endorsement helping to guide an otherwise uninformed choice. Or, the default choice can serve as an anchor or point of reference. If preferences are partly determined by how customers are introduced to the new pricing structure, welfare analysis becomes more complicated. Standard approaches that seek to rationalize default e ects using switching costs and information costs may overestimate the role of these costs if, in fact, preferences are learned and constructed.
We cannot de nitively distinguish between these alternative explanations in our context. Instead, we investigate heterogeneity in default proclivity, systematic di erences in follow-on behavior and some survey results from after the experiment. The patterns we uncover provide suggestive evidence on the mechanisms behind the default e ect and the implications for customer utility. Table 7 summarizes household-characteristics for never-takers (i.e., households assigned to the opt-out group who actively opt-out), always-takers (i.e., households assigned to the opt-in group who actively optin) and imputed values for complacents. To calculate the summary statistics for complacents, we leverage the random assignment across opt-in and opt-out groups which implies that the share of always-takers, never-takers, and complacents will be the same in expectation across the two groups. 20 The three columns on the right summarize statistical signi cance levels (p-values for the t-or z-test on di erences) for each pairwise comparison. The top of the table applies to the CPP treatments and the bottom to TOU.
Heterogeneity in Default Sensitivity
With respect to average usage, the ratio of peak to o -peak consumption, and electricity bills during summer months, there are very few statistically signi cant di erences across the groups in either the CPP or TOU settings. The indicators for structural winner, summarized in the fourth and fth rows of both the top and bottom panels, suggest that never-takers were statistically signi cantly more likely than complacents to be structural winners for TOU, which is the opposite of what a switching cost-based model would suggest. Several of the other di erences are similarly the opposite sign from what a switching cost model would predict, and are nearly statistically signi cant.
"My Account" and "My Account logins" re ect actions that customers could proactively take to mon-itor their consumption in the pre-treatment period. Customers who have historically engaged with these pre-existing information programs are more likely to take an active choice and either opt-in or opt-out. This is true for both CPP and TOU treatments. In both cases, the di erences between complacents and always takers as well as between complacents and never takers are statistically signi cant for both My Account and the number of logins (which provides a measure of how frequently a customer accesses her usage information). If we interpret these variables as proxies for attentiveness, we nd that complacent households have historically been signi cantly less attentive to their electricity consumption. This could re ect that members of the complacent group incur higher costs to engage and monitor their use in general. The lack of engagement with the existing programs could also raise the costs of making an active choice about enrolling in time-varying pricing.
The "low income" indicator summarizes participation in the utility's low-income electricity pricing program. We nd that consumers enrolled in the low-income rate are signi cantly more likely to opt in to time-varying pricing programs and somewhat less likely to opt-out, though the second di erence is not statistically signi cant for CPP. We note that households must proactively sign up for this rate, so the indicator captures the response among relatively attentive and engaged low-income households.
[TABLE 7 HERE]
In sum, we nd systematic di erences in the extent to which customers have historically been engaged in monitoring their electricity consumption, with complacent households signi cantly less engaged than other households in the sample. This is consistent with the default e ect re ecting inattention (rational or otherwise). The average projected gain or loss from switching to a time-varying rate is quite small (average gains among winners, and average loss among losers, are on the order of $15 over an entire summer). Given that gathering information about consumption patterns and alternative rate structures to make an informed decision requires time and e ort, inattention to these savings could be rational.
Heterogeneity in Follow-on Behavior
We also test for heterogeneity in the response to time-varying prices along several dimensions. We rst estimate a speci cation of Equation 2 that includes an interaction between the participation indicator and several of the household characteristics summarized in Table 7 . Note that the direct e ects of these variables on electricity consumption are absorbed by the customer xed e ect.
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The top panel of Table 8 reports interactions with the My Account indicator. The coe cients on the interaction terms are negative in 11 out of the 12 cases and statistically signi cant in 6 of those 11. Customers who had signed up for My Account prior to the study, and are presumably more attentive to their energy consumption, reduced consumption by signi cantly more on average during both event and non-event peak hours. Moreover, the average demand response on non-event days among CPP customers comprises a smaller share of the event-day response among these customers. This is consistent with the idea that less attentive customers will rely to a larger extent on modi cations that do not require sustained attention. The most striking di erences are found among complacents. The coe cients on the interaction term are all negative and larger than the coe cients on the treatment variable alone, though only statistically signi cant for the CPP group during event hours (column (3)). We note that the responses of complacents enrolled in My Account appear more similar to always takers than for complacents who have not activated My Account. For TOU, the e ects are large for complacents, even proportionately larger than for always takers, but the point estimates are small, so they are not statistically signi cant.
The middle panel of Table 8 tests for systematic di erences in price responsiveness among consumers enrolled in the low-income rate. The results indicate that always takers on the low-income rate are signi cantly less responsive during event and non-event hours for both the CPP and the TOU treatments.
This indicates that low-income enrolled customers that actively opted in did not provide as much peak savings. 21 Among complacents, the average demand response among consumers on the low-income rate is also smaller during critical events, although the di erences are not statistically signi cant. The demand response of low-income customers who were susceptible to the default e ect -and may be of particular interest to regulators -is statistically indistinguishable from the other complacent households.
Since our study period includes two years of post-intervention data, we can analyze how electricity demand response to the time-varying rates evolves over time. In particular, we can test for di erences in this evolution across customers who actively opted in and the complacent households who were nudged in by the opt-out encouragement. We modify Equation 2 to include an interaction between the treatment indicator and an indicator for the second summer. The bottom panel of Table 8 summarizes the estimation results. For the CPP treatments, the interaction term is positive for the always takers in the opt-in group (columns 1 and 4) and negative for the complacents (columns 3 and 6). Three out of four of the coe cients 21 This results holds when we estimate speci cations using log consumption. See Table A3. 28 are statistically signi cant. 22 This pattern suggests that demand response is attenuating over time among always takers. In contrast, the average demand response is increasing over time among complacents. This could be due to a growing number of complacents responding over time, or an increasing demand response from those complacent customers who had been actively responding in the rst summer.
In sum, we nd that as complacent customers gain experience with the new pricing regime, they mount a more signi cant demand response. Recall from Section 5.2. that complacents are no more likely than always takers to exit the program after gaining some experience. These results are consistent with the complacents gradually learning about and acclimating to the time-varying rate, and less consistent with a scenario in which complacents had well-formed preferences for the rates, knew they would dislike it but elect to remain on account of high switching costs.
Survey Results
Another source of evidence on households' preferences and decision processes is a set of follow-up surveys that SMUD conducted after the pricing program ended. The survey was sent to all households enrolled on the CPP and TOU pricing plans and a subset of the control group. While the survey respondents are by no means a random subset of the larger sample, the responses can provide some insight into consumers' motivations and sentiments about the pricing programs. The opt-out participants were less likely to respond to the survey -26% for opt-out (N=566) versus 36% for opt-in (N=183), consistent with the general nding thus far that complacents tend to be less engaged and less responsive. Also, only 60% of the respondents from the opt-out groups demonstrate that they understood the time-varying rates they were paying, compared to around 85% of the respondents from the opt-in group.
Survey responses generally suggest that customers are not averse to the new pricing plans. In both the opt-in and opt-out groups, fewer than 7% disagree with the statement, "I want to stay on my pricing plan. " More of the opt-in customers strongly agree with that statement and more of the opt-out customers express, "no opinion, " perhaps indicative of their complacency. Similarly, across both groups, almost 90% of respondents are either "Very satis ed" or "Somewhat satis ed" with their current pricing plan, with no statistically signi cant di erences across those two categories by group. In contrast, only 80% of the control group respondents are "very" or "somewhat" satis ed with the standard rate.
Overall, the results in this section suggest that customers who are more engaged with utility programs are more likely to make an active choice and either opt in to or opt out of the time-varying pricing programs. Customers who were expected to have lower bills on the program without changing their behavior (so-called "structural winners") were no more likely to enroll in the program, even if they were engaged in utility programs. We nd these patterns inconsistent with explanations for the default e ect that rely on consumers performing well-informed, cost-bene t calculations before making their choice and more consistent with other explanations, such as inattention and possibly some form of constructed preferences.
Once on time-varying pricing, consumers who were more attentive are also more likely to respond to the prices, although we still see signi cant reductions by the less attentive consumers in both the always taker and complacent populations. We also see convergence between always takers and complacents in the second summer, which we take as evidence that nudged consumers acclimated to the new pricing regimes.
Finally, at least among consumers who responded to the survey, there seems to be general acceptance of dynamic pricing. In sum, we see these results as consistent with a scenario where consumers are nudged onto the rates, perhaps because they are not paying attention, and once on the rates, they learn to adjust to them and some even prefer them to standard rates.
Conclusion
The default e ect is one of the most powerful and consistent behavioral phenomena in economics, with examples documented across many settings, including health care, personal nance and internet marketing. This paper studies this phenomenon in a new context -time-varying pricing programs for electricity.
Residential customers served by a large municipal utility in the Sacramento area were randomly allocated to one of three groups: (1) a treatment group in which they were o ered the chance to opt in to a timevarying pricing program, (2) a treatment group that was defaulted on to time-varying pricing unless they opted out, and (3) a control group. We document stark evidence of a default e ect, with only about 20% of customers opting into the new pricing programs and over 90% staying on the programs when it was the default option. This holds for both Critical Peak Pricing and Time-of-Use programs.
Our study o ers several innovations relative to the existing literature on default e ects. First, in addition to observing the initial decision that was directly manipulated by the default e ect, we also collect detailed data on follow-on behavior. We distinguish between follow-on behavior that modi es she orig-30 inal choice, such as opting out of the dynamic pricing program once it has begun, and behavior that is conditional on, but distinct from, the original choice. In our case, the latter involves adjusting electricity consumption in response to time-varying electric prices. We argue that this conditional behavior can be equally, if not more, important than the original choice. To our knowledge, ours is the rst study to identify and study this form of follow-on behavior.
We nd that consumers do adjust electricity consumption in response to the time-varying prices, even if they did not actively select them. In particular, the complacents in our study (i.e., consumers who would not have actively enrolled in the pricing program but did not opt out) reduced their consumption during Critical Peak Pricing periods by about 10%, when the price of electricity increased by nearly a factor of 10. Always takers, who actively selected the rates, reduced consumption by more than 25%, although over time, the always takers respond less and the complacents respond more.
Our second innovation is to analyze the initial decisions and follow-on behavior across di erent groups in our study in order to draw inferences about the likely explanations for the default e ect in our context.
Our ndings cast doubt on explanations for the default e ect based on high switching costs. We argue that the data are more consistent with explanations that feature consumers who are not paying attention to the initial choice, but come to understand it and like it.
In sum, we nd that placing households onto time-varying pricing by default can lead to signi cantly more customers on time-varying pricing and, more importantly, signi cantly higher responses to price changes, all without evidence of signi cant welfare losses. We expect that future work can similarly use follow-on behavior to draw inferences about default e ects. Notes: SMUD electricity rate structures in place during the treatment period. On the base rate, customers are charged $0.1016 for the rst 700 kWh in the billing period, with additional usage billed at $0.1830. Participants on the TOU rate were charged an on-peak price of $0.27/kWh between the hours of 4 PM and 7 PM on weekdays, excluding holidays. For all other hours, participants were charged $0.0846/kWh for the rst 700 kWh in each billing period, with any additional usage billed at $0.1660/kWh. On the CPP rate, participants were charged a price of $0.75/kWh during CPP event hours. There were 12 CPP events caller per summer on weekdays during the hours of 4 PM and 7 PM on weekdays. For all other hours, participants were charged $0.0851/kWh for the rst 700 kWh in each billing period, with any additional usage billed at $0.1665/kWh. Notes: Table compares household characteristics and pre-period usage statistics across control and treatment groups. Cells contain group means, t-statistics (in parentheses) obtained from a two-sample t-test between treated group and control group. Daily usage is the average per-customer electricity usage during the preperiod summer. Peak to o -peak ratio is the average hourly consumption during peak periods (4-7pm on weekdays) divided by the hourly kWh used during nonpeak times during the pre-period. Bill amounts re ect monthly bills. Structural winner is an indicator variable for whether the household would have experienced reduced bills in the pre-period summer had they been enrolled in either the CPP or TOU pricing plans. My Account is an indicator variable equal to one if the customer has enrolled in the online My Account program. My Account logins are the count of logins conditional on having logged in at least once. Paperless indicates that the household elected to recieve electronic bills. Low income indicates households had enrolled in the low income rate. Households are eligible for the low income rate if their income does not exceed 200 percent of the federal poverty level. Notes: Participation rates at beginning and end of enrollment period. Proportions are the count of enrolled customers divided by the count of total customers in each group, counts are the count of enrolled customers. Initial participation re ects the beginning of the treatment period (June 1st, 2012), while endline participation re ects rates at the end of the treatment period (September 30th, 2013) . Enrollment is counted if the customer entered the program (either by opting in or by being defaulted in) and did not opt-out before the given date. Customers who moved away are removed from both the count of enrolled customers and the count of total customers on the date they move. The attrition rate is the percentage change between initial and end-line participation. Notes: Figure depicts hourly impacts of enrollment on electricity usage in kilowatts during event days. Sample for critical event hours includes hours between 4pm and 7pm during simulated CPP events in 2011 (hottest 12 non-holiday weekdays between June and September) and actual CPP events in 2012-2013. Opt-in and opt-out e ects estimated by comparing the opt-in and opt-out experimental groups, respectively, to the control group. Complacent e ect estimated by comparing the opt-out experimental group to the opt-in experimental group. Treatment e ects estimated using two-stage least squares, with randomized encouragement into treatment used as an instrument for treatment enrollment. Dashed lines indicate the 95 percent con dence interval of the estimates with standard errors clustered by customer. The vertical bars indicate the peak period, between 4pm and 7pm. Table documents impact of treamtment enrollment on monthly bill. Sample composed of summer months. AT stands for always takers, C stands for complacents. Opt-in and opt-out e ects estimated by comparing the opt-in and opt-out experimental groups, respectively, to the control group. Complacent e ect estimated by comparing the opt-out experimental group to the opt-in experimental group. Treatment e ects estimated using two-stage least squares, with randomized encouragement into treatment used as an instrument for treatment enrollment. Treatment e ects estimated using two-stage least squares, with randomized encouragement into treatment used as an instrument for treatment enrollment. All regressions include customer and month of sample xed e ects. Notes: Table estimates cost-e ectiveness of each treatment group. All gures in millions of dollars and assume the program is scaled to SMUD's whole residential customer base and run for 10 years. See Appendix section 5 for details. (1) and (3) are sample means and standard deviations and (2) is computed from a comparison of the participants in the opt-out and opt-in groups. Columns (4) through (6) show p-values in brackets for di erences between listed groups. 
My Account
Treatment ( Notes: Table estimates heterogenous treatment impacts on hourly energy usage in kW by enrollment in My Account, low income indicator, and second year of program. My Account is an indicator variable equal to one if the customer has enrolled in the online My Account program. Low income is households enrolled in the low income rate. Year 2 is the second year of treatment period. For columns 1, 2, 4, and 5, regressors are instrumented with indicators for encouragement group and its interaction with the indicator variable for structural winners. Sample for columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 is composed of the control group and given treatment group. For columns 3 and 6, the instruments are enrollment into opt-out group and its interaction with the indicator variable for structural winners and sample includes only opt-in and opt-out treatment groups. Event hours include simulated critical peak events in 2011 and actual events in 2012 and 2013. Non-event peak day hours include all peak hours excluding critical event hours. All models include customer and hour of sample xed e ects, plus an interaction between the post-treatment period and given dimension of heterogeneity. Standard errors clustered by customer in parentheses.
